---
title: "SDK SQLGuard admits stacked statements, COPY…"
description: "GHSA-45jv-2j44-4c2q: SDK SQLGuard admits stacked statements, COPY TO PROGRAM, ATTACH and load_extension as verified… Affected and fixed versions of qwed."
url: https://qwedai.tech/security/advisories/ghsa-45jv-2j44-4c2q
---

[Security](https://qwedai.tech/security) · [Advisories](https://qwedai.tech/security/advisories) · GHSA-45jv-2j44-4c2q

# SDK SQLGuard admits stacked statements, COPY TO PROGRAM, ATTACH and load\_extension as verified read-only SQL

high Fixed in 8.0.0 GHSA-45jv-2j44-4c2q · Published 26 October 2026

## Summary

`QWEDClient.verify_sql()` uses the local `SQLGuard` whenever `qwed_new` is importable, instead of the hardened server-side `SQLVerifier`. `SQLGuard` parses only the **first** statement (`sqlglot.parse_one`) and checks it against a short mutation denylist. Stacked statements, `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`, `ATTACH DATABASE`, `load_extension()` and file-read functions are all reported as `verified: True` ("SQL Query verified safe and syntax-valid").

## Affected components

| Component | Location |
| --- | --- |
| `SQLGuard.verify_query` | `src/qwed_new/guards/sql_guard.py` |
| `QWEDClient.verify_sql` (local-first, API only on `ImportError`) | `qwed_sdk/client.py` ~L232-265 |
| Any agent or MCP integration that calls `SQLGuard` directly | Caller code |

## Root cause

1.  `sqlglot.parse_one(sql)` returns only the first expression, so `SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users` is checked as `SELECT 1`. Depending on the sqlglot version, it may also return an unparsed `exp.Command`.
2.  The guard is a **denylist** (`Drop, Delete, Insert, Update, Alter, Create, TruncateTable`). It does not cover `Copy`, `Attach`, `Command`, `Pragma`, `Grant`, or dangerous function calls.
3.  Function calls are not inspected at all.

## Proof of concept (local, synthetic)

```python
from qwed_new.guards.sql_guard import SQLGuard
g = SQLGuard()
for q in ["SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users",
          "COPY users TO PROGRAM 'id'",
          "ATTACH DATABASE 'x' AS y",
          "SELECT load_extension('x')",
          "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')"]:
    print(q, g.verify_query(q, "sqlite")["verified"])   # all True
```

Observed on 7.3.0 and `main` @ `52d3e06`. A single `DROP TABLE users` is correctly rejected; the bypass needs stacking or an unlisted statement or function.

## Impact

Integrity of SQL admission. A consumer that runs LLM-generated SQL only after `verify_sql(...).is_verified` (the read-only guarantee `SQLGuard` advertises) can be led to run destructive statements, load extensions, read server files or (PostgreSQL `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`) run OS commands. The actual effect depends on the database driver: many drivers reject multi-statement strings, while `executescript`, psql or some MySQL settings accept them. Attacker capability: control over the generated SQL. No credentials are needed.

## Affected versions

-   `qwed` on PyPI: **3.0.1 to 7.3.0**. `SQLGuard` and the local-first SDK path were added in `fd863c8`, first published in 3.0.1 (3.0.0 was not published to PyPI). Confirmed at runtime on 7.3.0.
-   The server's `SQLVerifier` in the same versions also admitted file and extension functions such as `load_extension()` and `pg_read_file()`.

## Patches

Fixed in **8.0.0** (`53f1226`):

-   `QWEDClient.verify_sql` (sync and async) always calls the server's `/verify/sql`, and `is_verified` follows the server's admission. A server that cannot be reached gives `UNVERIFIABLE`.
-   `SQLVerifier` denies a list of dangerous file, extension, network and command functions (`DANGEROUS_SQL_FUNCTIONS` in `core/sql_verifier.py`: `load_extension`, `readfile`, `pg_read_file`, `lo_import`, `dblink`, `load_file`, `xp_cmdshell`, `utl_file` and others) anywhere in a statement, as issue type `dangerous_function`.
-   `SQLGuard` accepts exactly one statement, allows only a read-only root, rejects administrative and destructive statements anywhere in the tree (the server's sets), `SELECT ... INTO`, MySQL executable comments and the same dangerous functions, and fails closed on parse errors.
-   The soundness eval reproduces the server part (`evals/cases/sql.json`, `sql-017` and `sql-018`).

Upgrade with `pip install -U qwed` (8.0.0 or later).

## Workarounds

Call the server's `/verify/sql` directly and gate on `admission == "ADMIT"`, and run generated SQL with a database user that has no file, extension or program-execution privileges.

## Related

GHSA-6p94-4f75-g2wq, GHSA-6cpx-8jrq-r7h3, GHSA-q5g6-6cw2-cjm3 (server `SQLVerifier`). The companion `CodeGuard` finding is [GHSA-4rj3-8wqj-cqwc](https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj3-8wqj-cqwc).

[All advisories](https://qwedai.tech/security/advisories)

Affected and fixed

qwed

Affected \>= 3.0.1, <= 7.3.0 Fixed in 8.0.0

Weakness

CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

[View on GitHub](https://github.com/QWED-AI/qwed-verification/security/advisories/GHSA-45jv-2j44-4c2q)
